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1 Introduction
Constantine Michalopoulos makes the point in
relation to agriculture that there is neither an
economic nor a political case to treat all developing
countries in the same way. Countries such as
Argentina and Brazil are clearly highly competitive
and parts of their agricultural sectors are well
developed. Their needs for support and assistance
are very different from those of, say, Kenya, Ghana
and Botswana. Yet all five states fall into the same
catch-allWorld TradeOrganization (WTO) category
of developing country. It is politically unrealistic
(and arguably not desirable) for the industrialised
countries to offer to Cairns Group members
flexibilities on WTO disciplines that would be
justified (and might be offered) to Kenya or Ghana.
Claire Melamed has described the question of which
countries might be eligible for special and differential
treatment (SDT) in future as ‘one of the main
stumbling blocks in the current debate on SDT’.
There is stalemate because the industrialised
countries justify their unwillingness to make
significant SDT offers on the grounds that they would
apply to all developing countries, while the latter
admit to a willingness to consider differentiation only
after significant SDT has been offered.
This impasse means that there does not exist, even
in embryonic form, a set of potential SDTmeasures
for which appropriate country/socio-economic
groupings could be proposed. Instead, the two
processes – of fashioning appropriate SDT and
identifying groups with special needs – must
proceed in parallel in the hope that, in due course,
they can be fused.
The article by Constantine Michalopoulos focused
particularly on the first process; this article
contributes to the second. The problems of country
classification can be reduced if SDT can be
concentrated on appropriate socio-economic groups
(such as poor farmers or vulnerable groups) or on
particular commodities (such as staple foods). But,
as Constantine Michalopoulos points out, there is a
limit to how much differentiation can be achieved in
this way. It seems inevitable that, in part, the
negotiation will have to grasp the nettle of deciding
whether or not some states have more claim to
flexibility than others. This article examines one
aspect: how to identify “food-insecure states”.IDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 2 2003
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2 The concept of “national” food
security
The answer to the question “which states are food
insecure?” is not obvious, since it is people not
countries that are normally considered to be food
secure or insecure. How can concepts and measures
that have been developed in relation to individuals
be applied to states? Is the prevalence of food
insecurity best indicated by poverty indicators (like
gross domestic product (GDP) per head), or are
there countries that are especially food insecure
even though they are not necessarily the poorest?
Having identified states that are food insecure, what
practical modulation of current, or likely future,
WTO commitments does this status justify? Do they
need less onerous subsidy restrictions, or priority
food and financial assistance outside the WTO, or
something else again?
2.1 Creating an analogy with individuals
If an analogy is made to the analysis of individuals
following Sen (Drèze and Sen 1990), the food
security of a state could be said to depend upon:
n its production entitlements, which reflect the
food that can be produced domestically;
n its trade entitlements, which reflect its ability to
earn sufficient foreign exchange with exports
(agricultural or non-agricultural) to purchase
imported food, and
n its transfer entitlements, which cover food that
can be obtained either directly through food aid
or indirectly by (semi-)commercial imports
financed through financial aid or industrialised
country export subsidies (see Stevens et al. 2000).
This suggests that the most food-insecure states are
those that combine insufficient domestic
production to ensure the entitlements of all the
population with an export structure (not necessarily
just for agriculture) that is unsatisfactory in terms of
one or more of the following characteristics:
n low per capita value and poor growth prospects;
n heavy dependence upon a small number of
commodities facing fluctuating supply or
demand;
n heavy reliance of exports on a single market
with fluctuating demand.
It follows that it is the combination of
characteristics that is important. Neither low GDP
nor dependence upon imported food are, by
themselves, necessarily indicators of national food
insecurity. Some modest importers could be more
insecure than larger importers – their low imports
indicate not an adequacy of domestic production
but an inadequacy of foreign exchange with which
to finance greater imports!
Another corollary is that the Agreement on
Agriculture is not the only WTO text that is
relevant to the issues raised by national food
insecurity. How much insecurity is created by the
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) or, as Constantine
Michalopoulos points out, the application of
sanitary and phytosanitary standards?
2.2 Applying the analogy to the World
Trade Organization
How well does existing WTO usage and
terminology capture this combination? The answer
is ‘not very well at all’. Within the WTO the term
“food security” is used in a very narrow sense and
relates primarily to the adequate supply of
imported food to member states. This usage reflects
concern raised during the Uruguay Round that the
liberalisation of world agricultural trade would lead
to a rise in world prices for commercial imports
and a reduction in the volume of food aid.
Some 22 states are recognised as net food-importing
developing countries (NFIDCs),1 and the 49 least
developed countries also receive special attention.
The NFIDC category is particularly questionable as
a basis for identifying food insecurity as defined in
this article. Only one NFIDC (Kenya) falls among
the 30 countries with the lowest calorie availability
(a fairly robust proxy for food insecurity), and three
of those 30 are neither least developed nor NFIDC
(UNDP 2000: Table 23).
The least developed country group comes closer to
satisfying the broad criteria of food insecurity. All
have a low level of production and limited economic
diversification. But restricting differentiated
treatment just to least developed countries would
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represent a substantial retreat of SDT. A reasonable
working assumption is that there exist some non-
least developed countries that are food insecure – but
how are they to be defined in a way that commands
respect? Some focusing will be necessary. An
operationally effective definition is needed to allow
modulation of those WTO rules with greatest food
security implications.
How could the existing definitions be developed
given that, in one sense, almost all aspects of the
WTO may have food security effects? It is hard to
imagine a consensus emerging among WTO
members for substantial and enforceable SDT
treatment to all states satisfying such broad criteria
unless it was restricted to the very poorest and
smallest states. Hence, a part (but preferably not the
totality) of SDT related to food insecurity will need
to be located within the Agreement on Agriculture.
A first step establishing the criteria for membership
of a food-insecure group of states is to identify the
areas of WTO rule-making in the Agreement on
Agriculture that might be problematic, and why.
This is done in the next section. Then, an initial
illustrative analysis is made of criteria that are
relevant to such concerns and of the range of
countries captured by various thresholds.
3 Modulating commitments
A precise identification of appropriate new SDT
measures cannot be provided until there exists some
greater understanding of the new rules likely to be
adopted in the Agreement on Agriculture
negotiations. But there is an expectation that the new
Round will cover all three of the main elements of the
Agreement on Agriculture “architecture”: market
access, export subsidies and domestic subsidies. Any
tightening of rules in these three areas will tend to
cause concern in different groups of states. These
are set out analytically and discussed in Table 1.
3.1 Market access
The market access concerns of food-insecure
developing countries will be largely focused on any
obligations they accept in relation to their own
barriers against imports rather than on changes to
industrialised country market access (but with one
exception). Many insecure countries either export
primary commodities that face low barriers in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) markets or, if they do not,
they have preferential access to protected markets.
For those exporting non-sensitive products, OECD
liberalisation is unlikely to result in any significant
change. And, arguably, developing country
liberalisation is likely to be less important in
stimulating world demand for their exports than is
developing country growth.
For countries with preferential access for sensitive
products, preference erosion is likely to affect trade
entitlements, but the main arena in which the pace
of erosion is set is that of the importing countries
rather than the WTO. Although multilateral
liberalisation will erode (and eventually remove)
preferences, it is unlikely that the current WTO
Round will take more than one, modest step in this
direction (for which remedies may be available
through bilateral negotiation). For example, the
European Union (EU) currently offers preferential
tariff quotas on beef to Southern African exporters,
the value of which will be eroded by reductions in
EU beef prices (resulting from reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy already adopted and,
possibly, from future changes agreed in the WTO).
The adverse effects of this could be reduced by
increasing (or lifting entirely) the tariff quotas.
The main “exception” of countries with a keen eye
on industrialised country market access are those in
which food imports represent a significant element
in total supply and which have fragile trade
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Table 1: Potential areas of concern over new agricultural trade rules
Rules on Potential legitimate concerns in
Lowering import controls Countries aiming to increase domestic agricultural production
Food-importing states
Reducing export subsidies Food-importing states
Reducing domestic subsidies Countries aiming to increase domestic production
entitlements. To the extent that the Doha Round
contributes to a decline in production in the most
heavily protected markets (mainly the OECD), it
will tend to increase world prices. An increase in
world prices will tend to result in an adverse
movement in the terms of trade of food-importing
developing countries. This could have an impact on
food security for those with limited opportunities to
boost exports or to increase domestic production.
3.2 Export subsidies
Such countries will be affected more directly by
curbs on the export subsidies currently provided
by a small number of OECD states. These could
have an immediate impact on world prices which
would persist at least until the exports of non-
subsidisers bounce back from their current,
artificially depressed, levels to take advantage of
the new opportunities. Even then, there could be a
lasting effect on trade entitlements.
These potential longer-term effects could arise from
the displacement of exports from subsidisers to non-
subsidisers. This could lead to a reduction in the
availability of imports to very poor countries, even if
world prices do not remain raised, to the extent that
they currently receive food aid or so-called “grey”
imports (that do not qualify as food aid, but are sold
at below market prices) from a subsidising state.
There is no reason to suppose that the increase in
exports from non-subsidisers will be made available
to the same poor countries and on the same terms as
the concessional exports that they replace.
3.3 Domestic subsidies
Countries in which there is an objective need to
boost domestic agricultural production will also be
concerned by any new WTO rules that limit the
scope for domestic subsidies. As Constantine
Michalopoulos shows, few developing countries
have been able (or willing) to provide subsidies for
agriculture that come anywhere close to the current
limits. Hence, the current restrictions have not
been constraining. But a further tightening of such
limits might cause difficulties for some states.
Moreover, as Constantine Michalopoulos argues,
the signal being sent out to these countries from
the WTO is the complete opposite of the message
that should be conveyed.
4 Identifying groups
There are thus two (possibly overlapping)
categories of countries that might be affected in
different ways by change to the three principal
elements of the current Agreement on Agriculture
architecture. These are:
1. Countries aiming to boost domestic
agricultural production that may wish to
increase incentives to farmers by keeping
import prices high and increasing domestic
subsidies.
2. Food-importing states with weak trade
entitlements that may be concerned about their
capacity to import sufficient food in future.
4.1 Relevant indicators
What indicators exist to identify the countries that
would be most vulnerable to such changes?2 At
present there exist the least developed country
group, which may equate to the first category of
states, and the NFIDC group, which is focused on
the concerns of the second category. But these are
not sufficient. Several attempts are being made to
develop further a set of operational categories (see,
for example, Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2000). Given the
uncertainties over the negotiations (both with
respect to new rules and to SDT) it is desirable that
this research pluralism continues. This article
contributes to the process.
An analysis of the types of indicator that might be
relevant is provided in Table 2. This takes the two
categories of countries identified in Table 1 and
lists for each some illustrative indicators.
n One group consists of those countries in which
agriculture is an important source of
livelihoods but production is low (where a
legitimate emphasis of policy is to boost
agricultural production – a task that might be
made more difficult by curbs on import
controls or domestic subsidies).
n The other consists of those countries that are
dependent on imports for a significant part of
domestic consumption but have weak trade
entitlements (and which would be vulnerable,
therefore, to sudden increases in world prices).
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In both cases, it is a combination of characteristics
that indicates particular vulnerability. For the first
group a necessary condition is that agriculture
should represent a relatively high proportion of
GDP. But reliance on this as the sole criterion
would include wealthy countries and those with
sufficient non-agricultural production that they can
easily assure the food security of their populations.
An additional criterion suggested in the table,
therefore, is that average per capita calorie supply
should be low. Alternative indicators can easily be
identified and, even if the one suggested finds
favour, it would be prudent to take a multi-year
average. But the present exercise is intended as an
illustration of a methodology, not a definitive
exercise.
Similarly, a high share of food imports in GDP is a
necessary criterion for establishing import
dependency but not a sufficient one. Low per capita
calorie supply will indicate which among such
countries have substantial vulnerable populations.
On top of these, some indicator is required of a
country’s weak trade entitlements. An off-the-peg
indicator is the composite vulnerability index
compiled under the auspices of the
Commonwealth Secretariat.3 This is used in the
following illustrative application of the criteria.
But, like all of the indicators used, alternatives
could be identified (and would lead to different
group memberships).
What type of country groups are thrown up by the
criteria trialled in this article? And how great is the
overlap with the existing least developed and
NFIDC groups? The next two sections show what
happens when an attempt is made to identify a
coherent group of countries, which have the
optimum combination of characteristics.
4.2 Calorie supply: the basic indicator
We start with per capita calorie supply, which is
suggested as the fundamental criterion. The Food
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)/World Health
Organisation (WHO) recommended minimum
level is 2,300 calories per day. Since there will be
substantial variations between consumption levels
within a country it is unrealistic to characterise as
low calorie availability only those countries with an
average per capita supply of less than this level. On
the other hand, it would be inappropriate for WTO
rules to give special consideration to countries just
because they have highly unequal consumption
patterns. A threshold of an average per capita
calorie supply of 2,500 has been taken as an initial
indicator to illustrate the range of countries that
would be brought in by such a threshold. It allows
for a limited degree of unequal calorie availability
within a country.
Table 3 presents the 72 countries for which data are
available that have an average per capita daily calorie
supply of less than 2,500 in ascending order of
calories. It also indicates whether or not the countries
are classified as least developed (LDC) or NFIDC.
It is evident that there is a weak correlation between
least developed and NFIDC states and per capita
calorie supply. The two categories cover some, but
not all states with low calorie supply. Twenty-five of
the countries fall below the 2,500 calorie threshold,
but are neither least developed nor NFIDC. Hence,
under current WTO country classifications, they
would be excluded from SDT unless it were also
available to Argentina, Brazil or Kuwait.
Moreover, a further four states are classified as least
developed but have a per capita calorie supply in
excess of 2,500 (and range from Mauritania with
2,622 to Cape Verde with 3,015). Twelve NFIDC
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Table 2: Relevant indicators for special and differential treatment
Characteristics of country Possible indicator
Agriculture is important source of livelihoods but production is low High share of agriculture in GDP
Low per capita calorie supply
Import dependence with weak trade entitlements High food imports as share of GDP
High vulnerability
Low per capita calorie supply
states have a calorie supply in excess of 2,500,
ranging up to 3,287 (Egypt). Hence the least
developed and NFIDC categories combined cannot
be used as an adequate indicator of food insecurity:
they exclude many countries that have lower
calorie availability than do some group members.
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Table 3: Average per capita calorie supply
Eritrea 1,622 Yes
Burundi 1,685 Yes
Congo Dem. Rep. 1,755 Yes
Mozambique 1,832 Yes
Comoros 1,858 Yes
Ethiopia 1,858 Yes
Haiti 1,869 Yes
Angola 1,903 Yes
Mongolia 1,917
Zambia 1,970 Yes
Kenya 1,976 Yes
Tanzania 1,995 Yes
Tajikistan 2,001
Central African Rep.2,016 Yes
Madagascar 2,021 Yes
Mali 2,029 Yes
Chad 2,032 Yes
Sierra Leone 2,035 Yes
Malawi 2,043 Yes
Cambodia 2,048 Yes
Yemen 2,051 Yes
Rwanda 2,056 Yes
Djibouti 2,084 Yes
Bangladesh 2,085 Yes
Uganda 2,085 Yes
Niger 2,097 Yes
Lao PDR 2,108 Yes
Cameroon 2,111
Burkina Faso 2,121 Yes
Solomon Islands 2,122 Yes
S.Tome/Principe 2,138 Yes
Congo Rep. 2,143
Zimbabwe 2,145
Bolivia 2,174
Namibia 2,183
Botswana 2,183 Yes
Nicaragua 2,186
Papua New Guinea 2,224
Guinea 2,231 Yes
Azerbaijan 2,236
Lesotho 2,243 Yes
Dominican Rep. 2,288 Yes
Peru 2,302 Yes
Sri Lanka 2,302 Yes
Turkmenistan 2,306
Venezuela 2,321 Yes
Guatemala 2,339
Gambia 2,350 Yes
Thailand 2,360
Antigua/Barbuda 2,365
Philippines 2,366
Nepal 2,366 Yes
Armenia 2,371
Sudan 2,395 Yes
Honduras 2,403 Yes
Senegal 2,418 Yes
Guinea-Bissau 2,430 Yes
Panama 2,430
Uzbekistan 2,433
Bahamas 2,443
Croatia 2,445
Kyrgyzstan 2,447
Togo 2,469 Yes
St Vincent 2,472 Yes
Pakistan 2,476 Yes
Cuba 2,480 Yes
Swaziland 2,483
Vietnam 2,484
Maldives 2,485 Yes
Benin 2,487 Yes
Seychelles 2,487
India 2,496
Country Daily per LDC NFIDCb
capita calorie 
supplya 1997
Country Daily per LDC NFIDCb
capita calorie 
supplya 1997
a Amount available for human consumption. Per capita supply represents the average supply available for the
population as a whole and does not necessarily indicate what is actually consumed by individuals.
Source: UNDP (2000): Table 23.
b Source: WTO (2002).
4.3 Indicators of agricultural
dependence
As suggested above, the sources of vulnerability
need not be agricultural, but at least part of the
relevant SDT is likely to fall within the Agreement
on Agriculture. To identify those states in which
the food insecurity may be agriculture related,
Table 4 brings in information on agricultural
value added as a share of GDP. It shows the share
of agriculture in GDP for all of the states with a
per capita calorie supply of under 2,500
(excluding six for which data are unavailable) and
also any other developing country where
agriculture accounts for more than 20 per cent of
GDP. Those countries in the table that are neither
least developed nor NFIDC but in which average
calorie supply is below 2,500 are indicated by
shaded lines.
The least developed and NFIDC categories appear
to overlap only to a limited extent with these other
criteria of vulnerability. No fewer than 30 of the 76
countries in the table are neither least developed
nor NFIDC, and 18 of these have an agricultural
sector that accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP.
They include several transition economies (which
are ignored as a group by the existing WTO
country classification) as well as a range of
developing countries including Vietnam, India,
Cameroon and Guatemala.
The overlap between these criteria (and the least
developed and NFIDC groups) is illustrated in
Figure 1. This shows the following:
n Forty-three states (of which 27 are least
developed and four NFIDCs) share the criteria
of a daily calorie supply of less than 2,500 and
agriculture accounting for more than 20 per
cent of GDP.
n There are a further 23 countries (six of which
are least developed) in which daily calorie
supply is less than 2,500 but agriculture is less
than 20 per cent of GDP.
n Apart from the countries for which data are
unavailable, only one least developed country
(but nine NFIDCs) falls outside the central
focus of the analysis.
n If special preferences were to be given to all
least developed countries plus non-least
developed with agriculture exceeding 20 per
cent of GDP and a daily calorie supply of less
than 2,500, then 26 countries that have one
criterion but not the other would be excluded
(17 states with daily calorie supply of less than
2,500 but a small agricultural sector, and nine
countries with a large agricultural sector but a
daily calorie supply exceeding 2,500).
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Figure 1: Overlap of indicators of agricultural dependence
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Guinea-Bissau 2,430 62.4% Yes
Albania 2,961 54.4%
Burundi 1,685 54.2% Yes
Myanmar 2,862 53.2% Yes
Lao PDR 2,108 52.6% Yes
Central African Rep.2,016 52.6% Yes
Cambodia 2,048 50.6% Yes
Ethiopia 1,858 49.8% Yes
Rwanda 2,056 47.4% Yes
Mali 2,029 47.0% Yes
Kyrgyzstan 2,447 46.0%
Tanzania 1,995 45.7% Yes
Uganda 2,085 44.6% Yes
Sierra Leone 2,035 44.2% Yes
Cameroon 2,111 42.4%
Togo 2,469 42.1% Yes
Niger 2,097 41.4% Yes
Nepal 2,366 40.5% Yes
Chad 2,032 39.8% Yes
Sudan 2,395 39.3% Yes
Comoros 1,858 38.7% Yes
Benin 2,487 38.6% Yes
Malawi 2,043 35.9% Yes
Guyana 2,530 34.7%
Mozambique 1,832 34.3% Yes
Nicaragua 2,186 34.1%
Burkina Faso 2,121 33.3% Yes
Armenia 2,371 32.9%
Mongolia 1,917 32.8%
Nigeria 2,735 31.7%
Uzbekistan 2,433 31.2%
Madagascar 2,021 30.6% Yes
Haiti 1,869 30.4% Yes
India 2,496 29.3%
Moldova 2,567 28.9%
Gambia 2,350 27.4% Yes
Pakistan 2,476 26.4% Yes
Kenya 1,976 26.1% Yes
Georgia 2,614 26.0%
Côte d’Ivoire 2,610 26.0% Yes
Vietnam 2,484 25.8%
Paraguay 2,566 24.9%
Mauritania 2,622 24.8% Yes
Turkmenistan 2,306 24.6%
Papua New Guinea 2,224 24.4%
Guatemala 2,339 23.3%
Guinea 2,231 22.4% Yes
Bangladesh 2,085 22.2% Yes
S. Tomé/Principe 2,138 21.3% Yes
Sri Lanka 2,302 21.1% Yes
Azerbaijan 2,236 20.3%
Honduras 2,403 20.3% Yes
Dominica 3,059 20.3% Yes
Zimbabwe 2,145 19.5%
Yemen 2,051 17.6% Yes
Senegal 2,418 17.4% Yes
Zambia 1,970 17.3% Yes
Philippines 2,366 16.9%
Maldives 2,485 16.4% Yes
Swaziland 2,483 16.0%
Bolivia 2,174 15.4%
Angola 1,903 12.3% Yes
Dominican Rep. 2,288 11.7% Yes
Congo Rep. 2,143 11.5%
Lesotho 2,243 11.5% Yes
Thailand 2,360 11.2%
St Vincent 2,472 10.9% Yes
Namibia 2,183 10.0%
Croatia 2,445 8.9%
Panama 2,430 7.9%
Peru 2,302 7.1% Yes
Tajikistan 2,001 5.7%
Venezuela 2,321 5.0% Yes
Seychelles 2,487 4.1%
Antigua/Barbuda 2,365 4.0%
Botswana 2,183 3.6% Yes
Table 4: Agricultural dependence and low-calorie status
Country Daily Agric. LDC NFIDCb
per value
capita added
calorie share 
supplya of GDPc
1997 1998
Country Daily Agric. LDC NFIDCb
per value
capita added
calorie share 
supplya of GDPc
1997 1998
a Amount available for human consumption. Per capita supply represents the average supply available for the
population as a whole and does not necessarily indicate what is actually consumed by individuals.
Source: UNDP (2000: Table 23).
b Source: WTO (2002).
c Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database website.
5 Negotiating differentiation
All attempts to introduce sub-groups of WTO
members will be politically fraught although, as
Claire Melamed argues, there appears to be a wider
developing country acceptance of the inevitability
of this corollary of significant new SDT than is
indicated in their public pronouncements. A
modest contribution to this generic problem is
made in the final article of the Bulletin. But, putting
aside this major issue, what forms of differentiation
might answer to the characteristics of the groups
identified above, and what agricultural trade issues
might arise in the negotiations? Different answers
are required for the groups identified in the top and
in the bottom rows of Table 2, where agriculture is
important but sickly, and where import
dependence is combined with weak trade
entitlements.
5.1 Relief from obligations
The SDT required for the first group would avoid
the rules designed primarily to erode the
substantial distortions caused by OECD subsidies.
Hence, it would be what might be called “negative
SDT”: a reduction of exemption from obligations in
respect of import controls and domestic subsidies
for agriculture. How “dangerous” would it be to the
international trade system if such countries were to
be accorded relief of this kind? Would it disrupt
world trade? Two illustrative indicators of the
answer are provided in Table 5. This takes the
countries listed in Table 44 and shows for each the
share of agricultural exports in GDP and the
country’s share of world agricultural trade.
These indicators are used on the assumption that the
principal “danger” for other WTO members is that,
sheltering behind high import barriers and benefiting
from substantial subsidies, some of these states might
boost substantially their agricultural exports, in
competition with those of other WTO members.
(Arguably, another concern is that SDT will result in
lower imports by these states and, hence, lower
exports by other WTO members. But, given that all
the countries included in Table 4 are ones with low
calorie availability, it can be inferred reasonably that
any effect on global demand will be minimal.)
The countries in Table 5 are listed in declining
order of their agricultural exports as a share of
world exports. Only two countries – Thailand and
India – account for over 1 per cent of world
agricultural exports, and only seven account for
over 0.25 per cent. Of these, only one (Côte
d’Ivoire) has a per capita calorie supply exceeding
the 2,500 threshold (although a further three –
India, Vietnam and Pakistan – come close). The
cumulative share of the rest is 3.89 per cent.
It goes beyond the scope of this initial essay to
assess whether or not WTO members would
consider countries supplying such low shares of
world exports to be a “threat” and, if so, whether
one could identify additional parameters for SDT
that would overcome the problem. But it would
appear to be worth serious consideration.
A combination of the following criteria would include
a larger number of low-calorie-supply countries (66)
than does the least developed criterion alone (37):
n daily per capita calorie supply of under 2,500;
and/or
n agriculture accounting for over 20 per cent of
GDP, and
n 0.25 per cent or less of world agricultural exports.
Clearly, this does not rule out situations in which a
state has a small share of the total but nevertheless
a large share in particular product groups where
industrialised countries also have production. This
could be accommodated by setting a maximum
share of imports for any product or, more
permissively, leaving exceptions to the general rule
to bilateral negotiation.
To see how this latter approach might work in
practice, consider the levels at which SDT can be
provided. There are three main levels:
1. General statements of principal in the Doha
Round Agreement that apply to all, or most, of
the sub-agreements.
2. Broad provisions within the Agreement on
Agriculture (such as would be in the proposed
Development Box discussed by Constantine
Michalopoulos).
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Thailand 5.80% 1.76% 1.76%
India 1.00% 1.20% 2.96%
Vietnam 8.50% 0.53% 3.49%
Côte d’Ivoire 21.20% 0.46% 3.95%
Guatemala 8.20% 0.38% 4.33%
Philippines 1.80% 0.37% 4.70%
Pakistan 2.00% 0.26% 4.96%
Kenya 9.70% 0.25% 5.21%
Uzbekistan n/a 0.24% 5.45%
Sri Lanka n/a 0.23% 5.68%
Zimbabwe 14.50% 0.20% 5.88%
Peru 1.30% 0.17% 6.05%
Cuba n/a 0.16% 6.21%
Paraguay 7.50% 0.15% 6.36%
Honduras 8.30% 0.14% 6.50%
Cameroon 5.20% 0.12% 6.62%
Nigeria 1.30% 0.12% 6.74%
Uganda 6.90% 0.11% 6.85%
Bolivia 4.40% 0.10% 6.95%
Ethiopia 6.30% 0.10% 7.05%
Papua New Guinea12.00% 0.10% 7.15%
Croatia n/a 0.09% 7.24%
Malawi 20.00% 0.09% 7.33%
Sudan n/a 0.09% 7.42%
Dominican Rep. 1.90% 0.08% 7.50%
Nicaragua 13.60% 0.08% 7.58%
Panama 3.20% 0.08% 7.66%
Swaziland 28.50% 0.08% 7.74%
Tanzania 3.50% 0.08% 7.82%
Moldova 27.70% 0.07% 7.89%
Venezuela 0.40% 0.07% 7.96%
Mali 9.00% 0.06% 8.02%
Myanmar n/a 0.06% 8.08%
Guyana 32.00% 0.05% 8.13%
Kyrgyzstan n/a 0.04% 8.17%
Senegal 2.30% 0.04% 8.21%
Bangladesh 0.30% 0.03% 8.24%
Benin 5.70% 0.03% 8.27%
Burkina Faso 5.10% 0.03% 8.30%
Namibia 4.00% 0.03% 8.33%
Niger 5.50% 0.03% 8.36%
Tajikistan n/a 0.03% 8.39%
Togo 8.30% 0.03% 8.42%
Turkmenistan n/a 0.03% 8.45%
Albania n/a 0.02% 8.47%
Azerbaijan 2.00% 0.02% 8.49%
Botswana 1.70% 0.02% 8.51%
Chad 5.70% 0.02% 8.53%
Georgia 1.30% 0.02% 8.55%
Guinea-Bissau 23.30% 0.02% 8.57%
Madagascar 2.20% 0.02% 8.59%
Mongolia 10.10% 0.02% 8.61%
Nepal 1.60% 0.02% 8.63%
Yemen 0.90% 0.02% 8.65%
Zambia 1.90% 0.02% 8.67%
Bahamas n/a 0.01% 8.68%
Burundi 7.70% 0.01% 8.69%
Cambodia 1.50% 0.01% 8.70%
Central African Rep.2.70% 0.01% 8.71%
Congo Dem. Rep. n/a 0.01% 8.72%
Djibouti n/a 0.01% 8.73%
Dominica n/a 0.01% 8.74%
Gambia 9.30% 0.01% 8.75%
Guinea 1.00% 0.01% 8.76%
Haiti n/a 0.01% 8.77%
Lao PDR 2.20% 0.01% 8.78%
Mauritania 3.60% 0.01% 8.79%
Mozambique 0.80% 0.01% 8.80%
Rwanda 2.40% 0.01% 8.81%
Solomon Islands n/a 0.01% 8.82%
St Vincent n/a 0.01% 8.83%
Congo Rep. 0.80% 0.01% 8.84%
Armenia 1.00% 0.00% 8.84%
Comoros 3.40% 0.00% 8.85%
Lesotho 0.80% 0.00% 8.85%
Sierra Leone 1.20% 0.00% 8.85%
Angola 0.10% 0.00% 8.85%
Eritrea 0.50% 0.00% 8.85%
S. Tomé/Principe 10.60% 0.00% 8.85%
Seychelles 0.30% 0.00% 8.85%
Antigua/Barbuda n/a 0.00% 8.85%
Maldives n/a 0.00% 8.85%
Table 5: Trade share of vulnerable states
Country Agric. Agric. Cum.
exports exports share of
as share as share world
of GDP of world agric.
1999 agric. exports
exports 2000
2000
Country Agric. Agric. Cum.
exports exports share of
as share as share world
of GDP of world agric.
1999 agric. Exports
exports 2000
2000
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators database website (GDP); FAO Statistical Databases website
(agricultural export values).
3. Specific commitments in each member’s
implementation schedules, which are subject
to bilateral negotiation during the Round.
A broad exemption could be provided at either of
the top two levels but with a caveat stating the
grounds on which a member could object to its
application by a given state (e.g. both have a non-
trivial share of world trade in a given product). It
would then become a matter for bilateral
negotiation over specific national commitments.
The Single Undertaking provision of WTO
negotiations – whereby nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed – would limit the extent to
which the initial agreement of principle became a
hostage to fortune.
5.2 Special and differential treatment
on import dependency
It was suggested in Table 1 that poor countries,
dependent upon agricultural imports and with
weak trade entitlements, might legitimately be
concerned about industrialised country actions
that would tend to increase the price, or otherwise
reduce the availability, of food imports. The
appropriate SDT in such cases would not be relief
from tougher rules governing their own trade and
production policies, but compensatory action
(either within the WTO or by prior agreement via
other institutions) to help them to adjust to such
change.
There are two key issues: one is how such
compensating action is to be enforced; how, for
example, can assistance provided by independent
agencies be related to the negotiations? A small
contribution to dealing with this major question is
made in the final article of the Bulletin. The other key
issue, dealt with in this section, is whether a better
categorisation of such countries can be obtained.
The aim of the least developed and NFIDC
categories combined is to identify such countries,
but one may question how well this is achieved.
Table 6 provides an illustration of this inadequacy.
The table, in which states are presented in
declining order of agricultural imports as a share of
GDP, shows calorie availability, the vulnerability
index, agricultural imports as a share of GDP, and
least developed/NFIDC status for:
n all the states with per capita calorie supply of
under 2,500,5 and
n any state with greater vulnerability (higher
index number) than the mean for states
registering under 2,500 calories (shaded in the
table).
The table suggests that the least developed and
NFIDC categories miss some states that ought to be
included. For example, if one takes agricultural
imports of over 5 per cent of GDP as a threshold,
there are three states that do not fall into either
group and for which agricultural imports exceed
this level and calorie supply is below 2,500 per
capita and trade vulnerability is high. This number
increases to five if the states at the foot of the table
(for which import and/or GDP data are not
available) are assessed on the other two criteria.
At the same time, seven of the 22 NFIDCs6 and five
least developed countries7 do not appear in the
table at all, indicating that they have over 2,500
calories per capita plus a lower trade vulnerability
and/or agricultural import dependence. Since the
source of most compensatory assistance will
probably be the main aid donors (regardless of the
institutional route through which it is provided),
and given that they recognise the least developed
group as one for special aid attention, the absence
of some least developed countries from Table 6 is
probably not serious. If one identified as the
countries requiring special concern all least
developed countries plus non-least developed
countries that have low calorie availability, high
trade vulnerability, and significant proportionate
food imports, then coverage would be reasonably
good.
6 Conclusions
There are strong views about the desirability or
otherwise of developing countries liberalising their
import regimes, and on how they should deal with
change in global markets following OECD
liberalisation. But they are not the concern of this
article. This is not because they are unimportant,
but because there are other relevant questions that
also need to be discussed and because so little is yet
known about which proposals will finally make it
to the agricultural negotiating table.
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Table 6: Trade vulnerability and low-calorie status
Country Agric. imports Daily per capita Composite LDC NFIDC
as share of calorie supplyb vulnerability
GDPa 1999 1997 index c
Gambia 27.87% 2,350 9.331 Yes
S. Tomé/Principe 19.98% 2,138 7.69 Yes
Sierra Leone 19.51% 2,035 5.06 Yes
Mauritania 19.40% 2,622 6.068 Yes
Lesotho 18.68% 2,243 5.985 Yes
Swaziland 17.76% 2,483 9.633
Comoros 14.26% 1,858 5.425 Yes
Nicaragua 13.50% 2,186 4.92
Yemen 11.46% 2,051 5.259 Yes
St Lucia 10.68% 2,734 7.449 Yes
Senegal 10.40% 2,418 5.026 Yes
Seychelles 9.01% 2,487 6.375
Guyana 8.31% 2,530 7.953
Honduras 8.07% 2,403 5.373 Yes
Mauritius 7.37% 2,917 6.51 Yes
St Kitts/Nevis 7.01% 2,771 6.362 Yes
Angola 6.80% 1,903 6.282 Yes
Niger 6.70% 2,097 4.957 Yes
Fiji 6.55% 2,865 8.888
Jamaica 6.46% 2,553 7.484 Yes
Belize 6.39% 2,907 6.652
Botswana 6.15% 2,183 10.158 Yes
Benin 6.00% 2,487 5.06 Yes
Papua New Guinea 5.93% 2,224 6.308
Togo 5.47% 2,469 5.248 Yes
Nepal 5.20% 2,366 5.173 Yes
Malaysia 5.00% 2,977 5.903
Burkina Faso 4.65% 2,121 4.923 Yes
Mozambique 4.55% 1,832 4.907 Yes
Bangladesh 4.51% 2,085 4.744 Yes
Congo Rep. 4.49% 2,143 5.961
Panama 4.16% 2,430 4.995
Pakistan 3.95% 2,476 4.795 Yes
Uganda 3.77% 2,085 4.876 Yes
Guinea 3.71% 2,231 5.282 Yes
Rwanda 3.63% 2,056 4.797 Yes
Philippines 3.51% 2,366 4.595
Mali 3.48% 2,029 5.083 Yes
Central African Rep. 3.37% 2,016 4.802 Yes
Guatemala 3.33% 2,339 4.431
Namibia 3.31% 2,183 6.527
Dominican Rep. 3.21% 2,288 4.858 Yes
Kenya 3.12% 1,976 4.935 Yes
Zimbabwe 2.97% 2,145 4.969
Tanzania 2.96% 1,995 5.035 Yes
Constantine Michalopoulos’s (this volume) review
of the deficiencies of the current Agreement and of
some developmentally desirable options for its
successor has established that a case exists in
favour of some kinds of differentiation. He has also
presented the case that this should extend beyond
the least developed countries but not encompass
the full developing country group. This is sufficient
to establish the prima facie desirability of
investigating appropriate memberships for such
groups.
While the main country groupings in the WTO are
self-selecting or adopted from other institutions, it
is not quite true to say that the WTO has no
operationally effective rules that apply only to
internally agreed groups. As Claire Melamed (this
volume) points out, differentiation in relation to
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures applies to countries which have a per
capita income of less than US$1,000 per year. This
precedent could be developed to provide the subtle
differentiation that the preceding analysis suggests
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Zambia 2.80% 1,970 5.549 Yes
Ethiopia 2.55% 1,858 4.786 Yes
Malawi 2.44% 2,043 5.2 Yes
Bolivia 2.37% 2,174 4.691
Chad 2.24% 2,032 5.12 Yes
Burundi 2.11% 1,685 4.929 Yes
Madagascar 1.90% 2,021 4.785 Yes
Peru 1.88% 2,302 4.461 Yes
Thailand 1.87% 2,360 4.264
Cameroon 1.60% 2,111 4.952
Venezuela 1.37% 2,321 4.887 Yes
India 0.86% 2,496 3.782
Antigua/Barbuda n/a 2,365 11.246
Bahamas n/a 2,443 10.433
Congo Dem. Rep. n/a 1,755 5.186 Yes
Djibouti n/a 2,084 7.932 Yes
Dominica n/a 3,059 8.122 Yes
Gabon n/a 2,556 6.229
Grenada n/a 2,768 7.848
Haiti n/a 1,869 4.474 Yes
Maldives n/a 2,485 8.654 Yes
Solomon Islands n/a 2,122 8.398 Yes
Sri Lanka n/a 2,302 5.076 Yes
St Vincent/Grenadines n/a 2,472 6.563 Yes
Sudan n/a 2,395 4.655 Yes
Vanuatu n/a 2,700 13.295 Yes
a Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators database website (GDP); FAO Statistical Databases website
(agricultural import values).
b Amount available for human consumption. Per capita supply represents the average supply available for the
population as a whole and does not necessarily indicate what is actually consumed by individuals.
Source: UNDP (2000: Table 23).
c Source: Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank (1999).
Table 6 (cont.)
Country Agric. imports Daily per capita Composite LDC NFIDC
as share of calorie supplyb vulnerability
GDPa 1999 1997 index c
is needed if SDT is to be concentrated on the most
food-insecure states.
An alternative is to make wider use of the
precedent set by the least developed country
group: to borrow from other institutions a set of
criteria and application mechanism. The UN
negotiated the criteria for membership of the least
developed group and maintains a list (reviewed
from time to time) of the countries that meet them.
FAO, for example, could be charged with
establishing categories of food-insecure state that
relate to the areas of WTO rules. The councils of
the FAO, therefore, rather than those of the WTO
would be charged with the tricky task of
identifying countries with sickly agricultural
sectors and weak trade entitlements. The WTO’s
role would be limited to identifying variations on
its rules that address these disadvantages, and
determining whether or not the use of such
variations by any given member would risk any
significant trade harm to another.
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Notes
1. WTO (2002) lists 23 NFIDCs, but one – Senegal – is
also a least developed country, and has been
included in that group rather than in the NFIDC
group in this article.
2. The following analysis overlooks the problems of
countries with strong entitlements but population
groups with weak entitlements (because of
inequitable domestic distribution). This is because
problems of this type are dealt with more
appropriately by the targeted SDT approach
described above.
3. The composite vulnerability index (designed initially
to respond to the problems that small countries
perceive that they face) aims to integrate three
aspects of vulnerability: economic exposure,
remoteness and insularity, and susceptibility to
environmental events and hazards. It uses the
following variables to measure these aspects: export
dependence (exports as a share of GDP), the
UNCTAD diversification index, and, for small states,
the proportion of the population affected by natural
disasters over a long period of time (Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank 1999).
4. Plus the six countries excluded from Table 4 because
of lack of the relevant data.
5. Except 14, for which vulnerability data are not
available.
6. Plus one (Cuba) for which neither vulnerability
index nor GDP data are available.
7. Plus nine for which calorie supply data are not
available.
References
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 1999, ‘Small
states: a composite vulnerability index. First draft’,
paper prepared by the Joint Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank Task Force for the
‘Conference on the Small States’, 17–19 February,
St Lucia, West Indies
Diaz-Bonilla, E., Thomas, M. and Robinson, S., 2000,
‘Food security and trade negotiations in the World
Trade Organization: a cluster analysis of country
groups’, TMD Discussion Paper 59, Washington DC:
Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International
Food Policy Research Institute
Drèze, J. and Sen, A. (eds), 1990, The Political
Economy of Hunger, Oxford: Clarendon Press
FAO, Statistical Databases, http://apps.fao.org/default.htm
Stevens, C., Greenhill, R., Kennan, J. and Devereux,
S., 2000, ‘The WTO agreement on agriculture and
food security’, Economic Paper 42, London:
Commonwealth Secretariat
UNDP, 2000, Human Development Report 2000,
Geneva: United Nations Development Programme
World Bank, World Development Indicators database,
www.worldbank.org/data/dataquery.html
WTO, 2002, ‘WTO list of net food-importing
developing countries for the purposes of the
Marrakesh ministerial decision on measures
concerning the possible negative effects of the reform
programme on least-developed and net food-
importing developing countries (“the Decision”)’,
G/AG/5/Rev.5, 26 March, Geneva: World Trade
Organization, Committee on Agriculture
